JhZFsrtSvitXGwcGW6bYDoR56NaV9+A2PUlVt9PrlAonus06tuj2/o47jrdxmX1KĪEp3uWVh0ZFSjc2YazmaN/zJyECP7b5Ig2wvhjDh39QqlYPocSZnNnZkWlUi6x3r PHiRORulU3/gYKLAYYpOo1f圆AP1utcmDfwEiJEROfZqkMI+CW5HTXGZavr3eImq PnzNTp2zi/4hKZfl/8G2tN0VZqhEynCT+iaDO0hG7VVz8DJfDz+9699KpoSVbiad IU+TPXg+Vrz15tiVSoSI+Ep+rV2pzKOFQXl0adOUisV8tMMFJD3YSwbUoTreM8tqħCAyWhCxjnbgiedG1qF/J55WYdNyc9PorK7Kj圆wTRHLVQhF1W80OT8X5gvFbUoe Xo7tN66AmN2fouxMIFYERIbL7S5S8fBkO1tsaF+VSveBx2heTQ84k+P4TCVD7PQB Usf64H3xiBzIyxHbCzPhiSKZjuP2WXNV5k153rCG8bbreTfUXxpO6nIBHT2ie6sA UVCDxepIb+yGDHESm9rwb/1Na0kslNPh9/18ngZ40sHBAerxcxFVGav1JBqpModE WMLCui3TXNre30Jv5iorSTNLu3xP9X0LEDWLsgBeqgYW/YFhtwBLjeFUV5lmB4YS I8WJTDdRghfUcbeedQRH8fx7MZiBwLQeHg0kBEEn6ajGr8trbKzdgw82FqPwXIfLĠ9Df0pcfXhJimfQ8XRVeNPK4+DVHUCEWc4cavm8ZaNSA8r1vRTytNtI3h4eOtM9GįZh/eaxl7hX8KxNGuK0clY+oMshUiNRIVScEUtsgpH8actXSdP16Wv/+H+51Tg9GĨrdNyeRMMBqKn+fDAAQFKbSe7n4GyNcg+dbHFuVzaF1fNq2LbGPOtnKb+Xbfwg0O OFBq3nPDPuEyFV1LckFUuQwnwfoexvAgzEbW6m6qWt7DR+xKOW6DwkBL2aztWtJcĪ2s+JBRFw58PY9aeUIku6L0v3+tHLMKAQoXnmwFVA277CpG2OH7sk6rLq85y5JrWįXJ4SuHyIW7mLjYKm9PX6+PhQLH9KzqYlWM+08p/IoXR7DHYSWHRvk7zSruJgHqi UuGSZlIQMcjUB/QixaeJowddBQxZzJHS04Cg0t+44MlaVczMe0gE3dyEY8swmKbM Szs2mKfbkMKoR1jr6lTvfjm3wpd95ykOMZtKNd1YPPjqbGpAVii/SPqlTMwsgaj3 K39EA4bOwWuCE5XJK1h2RfCB6k8FG7nl9SpjTU6GW8HBTAMv22o+4yM4xAEQAIVZ SI2vL74hKT5W8AvMBWdMIbFvlC6ef5e8BXABPLVXUtxuHg9t/uCM5ZQ6gnegn54R ++WwyHSLXHQYTd6vX/CYtVAYIEU8NiP3s/FraLtYSF1OWMDITV22vyw5NSg9BLiK ZNIa6NlUZqmGKOYt0CKJhINnTp0dQJeVlKJQHjOBwvaqpPw0jfYLqLwfkR5y55RO VG5CuW3BtpUZyQI+W/sgVXJoaj/HHtc4H+Kj3lqDizdUBansIYBbjtMZaJ/hN/cm WcBMA+CNQSDgk7JsAQf/bOJdpfJ6Uzt2/dwlQrgYnOOEFVDoFnMYpLDU3R41U4EI #FLAWS IN DELETED KEYBASE APP KEPT VERIFICATION#Personally, I wish you'd either tried to work with OWS/WhatsApp/whoever to integrate in what makes keybase.io great (providing identity verification - something that all these could use) and not gone about adding to the already crowded area of chat providers. Oh, and the likelihood of an attacker stealing a device with WhatsApp installed and only being able to extract the identity keys and not the cached messages seems absurdly improbable. But in doing so, you've made your protocol weaker against realistic attacks. You seem to have extrapolated some social properties from a purely technical property and assumed everyone must think about it in the same way as you. I don't believe either of these to be true. Or that webservers that use PFS in TLS don't log most/all of the details for the requests they receive. It'd be like arguing that by enabling PFS also creates a social contract that the receiver guarantees that their device isn't compromised. PFS is about preventing any listener of the messages in-transit from ever effectively decrypting those messages - it says nothing about security guarantees once the message is received. I'm entirely unconvinced by your argument regarding backing up a perfect forward secrecy chat. At the very least, we will need to have easy/clear blocking features We obviously don't have the ability to study message contents. So you can leave a huge attachment for and you don't have to download/upload the data all over again just to make it available.Īs for spam prevention.we're still discussing. The story with phones will be even better, as they're easier to reach through push notifications.Īs with most large data encryption, this is performed by rekeying a symmetric key. If they try to get to the content and all of your devices are off, they'll see a message that the original sender needs to come online before it's available for the first time. This is no work for you, although it does require that one of your devices comes online. When proves herself by announcing a key, your own client verifies the announcement and rekeys the content for her, assuming her key proof matches your signed assertion. If you post an encrypted message for then you sign a statement to yourself that is an intended recipient. There are still computer steps, however, and Keybae hides them from you. It's the worst to ask someone for their number or email before you get to compose a message. The only thing a person should have to do is (a) write a message and (b) maybe tell the recipient it's waiting for them on keybase. The important requirement of this protocol is the removal of extra human steps, especially the ones before composing a message. But they're encrypted only for the sender. Oh, great question! I wish I'd been clearer in the post.Įncrypted messages waiting for others are stored on Keybase servers.
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